Preserving monetary and financial stability in small, open and financially integrated economies (SOFIEs)

The National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia and Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee conference
Two perspectives on the global economy and the IMFS

• Common (pre-crisis) perspective:
  • Global current account imbalances
  • Asymmetric adjustment
  • Keep your house in order
  • Official arrangements: lending to sovereigns of debtor countries to facilitate balance of payments adjustment

• Alternative perspective:
  • Global financial integration
  • Financial imbalances
  • Spill-overs and feedback
  • Keeping your house in order is necessary but not sufficient
  • Additional instruments: e.g., liquidity provision to internationally active banks – CB swaps

• Not mutually exclusive
Global financial integration and SOFIEs: theory

• Taking global financial integration to its economic extreme and assuming constant risk premia =>

• Long term rates in SOFIEs become determined by monetary policy in the big countries (core rate-setters)

• Inflation targets can still be reached through the exchange rate channel

• If exchange rates are “well behaved” and the financial sector sufficiently regulated and supervised =>

• A floating exchange rate and “keeping your own house in order” is sufficient for independent monetary policy and financial stability
Global financial integration and SOFIEs: empirics

• Data on long-term rates and spreads consistent with the story (and lot of other empirical work as well) – we are still some way from the theoretical limiting case

• Before the crisis, some argued that these patterns could be due to common shocks, spread of similar monetary policy frameworks (IT around 2% and CB policy rates as the main instrument), and increased credibility

• Case studies, comparisons of pre- and post-crisis periods, and other observations make it more and more plausible that GFI is the main driver

• It is also at play between big countries
Evolving correlations between SOE and US/euro area sovereign yields

10-year rolling correlations, average monthly yields

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<tr>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Iceland</th>
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<th>Israeli</th>
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Rolling correlation between the domestic SOE and US and euro area short- and long-term sovereign spreads. The short-term interest rate is a 3-month market rate and the long-term yield is a 10-year government bond yield.

Sources: Bloomberg, Datastream, BIS, BIS calculations.

1 Monthly changes using a 36-month moving window; for Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, 24-month moving window. Ten-year bond yields.

Correlation between domestic and US long–term yields

Graph Number

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1 Rolling correlations between the domestic SOE and US 10-year government bond yields. For European countries, also with euro area 10-year government bond yields. 2 Rolling correlation between the domestic SOE and the US and euro area short- and long-term sovereign spreads. The short-term interest rate is a 3-month market rate and the long-term yield is a 10-year government bond yield.

Sources: Bloomberg, Datastream, BIS, BIS calculations.
GFI and SOFIEs: problems

• Exchange rates do not smoothly reflect fundamentals: UIP does not hold except in the long run, and then with sharp and disorderly corrections – carry trade

• Volatile capital flows driven by push factors (global financial conditions)

• Interaction with financial vulnerabilities; e.g., domestic currency mismatches and international activities subject to regulatory gaps of domestically headquartered banks

• Behind empirical conclusions that IMP is becoming more difficult in SOFIEs, irrespective of the exchange rate regime (e.g., Rey (2013))

• Still a trilemma but with trade-offs of variable severity (e.g., Obstfeld (2015))
Global financial integration and SOFIEs: conclusions

• A floating exchange rate is not sufficient for “safe” monetary policy independence
• It is becoming increasingly difficult for SOFIEs to conduct independent monetary policies without creating risks to financial stability
• Keeping your own house in order is not sufficient
What can countries do on their own?

• Give up on independent monetary policy:
  • Monetary union
  • Fixed exchange rate
  • Interest rate pegged to those of global rate-setters
  • Other policies have to take care of domestic economic stabilisation – but will they?

• Increase resilience and ability to live with exchange rate fluctuations (reduce the fear of floating) – regulate FX risk on bank balance sheets, currency mismatches, etc.

• Use more tools, some of which actually decrease the level of financial integration (but hopefully where it matters less for efficiency and growth): FX intervention, “orthodox” macropru and capital flow management: => inflation targeting plus
Monetary policy after capital controls on outflows in Iceland (inflation targeting plus) – CBI (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential changes</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More flexible IT – longer horizon</td>
<td>Partly implemented in practice – formalisation needs a renewal of an agreement with the government on IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FX intervention/managed float</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better support from prudential policies</td>
<td>Large improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved co-ordination between fiscal and monetary policy</td>
<td>Macroeconomic Council</td>
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## Prudential regulations or tools after lifting capital controls on outflows in Iceland – (CBI (2012))

<table>
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<th>Regulation or tool</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>a) LCR and NSFR in FX</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
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<td>b) Restrictions on deposit-taking in foreign branches</td>
<td>Partly restricted by a) – future issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Limits on FX imbalances</td>
<td>In progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Restrictions on FX lending to unhedged borrowers</td>
<td>CB has been given powers to limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Capital flow management tool for capital inflows</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
</tr>
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What does this mean for reform of the IMFS?

• Review IMF surveillance and facilities and other parts of the global financial safety net in light of the second perspective (begun, e.g., new reports, new facilities (PCL and FCL), and stock-taking of IMS and GFS)

• Reduce financial regulatory flaws and gaps at the global and regional level – capital flows and cross-border banking

• Institutionalisation of CB swaps?

• Accommodate but monitor SOFIEs’ unilateral use of additional tools (CFM tools in particular)

• Rules of the game?
Selected further reading

• Central Bank of Iceland (2010). Monetary policy in Iceland after capital controls. Available at www.cb.is.
• Central Bank of Iceland (2012). Prudential rules following capital controls. Available at www.cb.is